The Reference Class Problem for Credit Valuation in Science by Lee, Carole J.
 1 
 
Lee, Carole J. “The reference class problem for credit valuation in science.” Philosophy of 
Science 87, no. 5 (2020): 1026-1036. 
 
 
The Reference Class Problem for Credit Valuation in Science 
Carole J. Lee 
c3@uw.edu 
Department of Philosophy, Box 353350, University of Washington, Seattle, WA 98195 
 
Abstract: Scholars belong to multiple communities of credit simultaneously. When these 
communities disagree about a scholarly achievement’s credit assignment, this raises a puzzle 
for decision and game theoretic models of credit seeking in science. The reference class 
problem for credit valuation in science is the problem of determining to which of an agent’s 
communities — which reference class — credit determinations should be indexed for an act 
under some state of nature. Solving this problem requires developing rich, mutually informed 
theories of community and credit that are sensitive to the structure and status systems of 









Within the scientific community, there is a common understanding that its hypercompetetive 
reward system fuels the replication crisis and drives demoralized researchers out of the 
academic pipeline. Conversely, there is also a shared sense that, in order to change these 
cultures and behaviors in ways that would improve science, the scientific community must 
coordinate across institutions to change how credit is assigned to individual scientists 
(Alberts et al. 2014; National Science Foundation 2015; Nosek et al. 2015; Aalbersberg et al. 
2017; Blank et al. 2017; NASEM 2018). The hope is that changes to individual researchers’ 
incentives will improve the integrity and completeness of the published record and secure the 
health of our future scientific workforce.1 
Analogously, philosophers working in the “credit economy” tradition adopt the 
working assumption that there is some amount of credit that agents can accrue for different 
acts under different states of nature. This assumption allows them to use decision and game 
theoretic tools to model how credit seeking among individual scientists can give rise to 
behavior and norms that support or thwart the achievement of community-wide goals. When, 
in the aggregate, individual credit seeking cuts against collective ends, their approach can 
explore how changes to individuals’ incentive structures can nudge and redirect individual 
 
1 Institutions can also experience incentives that promote or thwart scientific ends (Lee and 
Moher 2017). 
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behavior (Kitcher 1990; Strevens 2003; Bright 2017; Bruner and O’Connor 2017; Heesen 
2017; Rubin and O’Connor 2018; Zollman 2018). Different philosophers make different 
assumptions about the norms by which credit gets allotted — for example, whether credit is 
all or nothing (Strevens 2003; Bright 2017; Heesen 2017) or comes in degrees (Bruner and 
O’Connor 2017; Rubin and O’Connor 2018; Zollman 2018). However, the general approach 
assumes that there is some precise way to assign credit to different acts under different states 
of nature — an assumption that allows these philosophers to model credit-seeking behavior 
and the emergence of scientific norms in formally tractable ways.  
But, how much credit gets assigned to any given act under any given state of nature? 
Just as each of us simultaneously belongs to multiple social categories, each of which is tied 
to implied social hierarchies (Crenshaw 1989; Macrae, Bodenhausen, and Milne 1995), each 
scholar simultaneously belongs to multiple communities of value with implied social 
hierarchies for assigning credit. To which of an agent’s communities — which reference 
class — should credit determinations be indexed and why? 
In this article, I use examples from the current context of science’s complex and 
dynamic culture to motivate and illuminate what I will call the reference class problem for 
credit valuation in science. Those familiar with the generality problem for reliabilist 
epistemologies (Feldman 1985) will recognize some structural commonalities. In both, the 
valuation of a token case depends on the type to which it is assigned; however, because there 
is no determinate way to identify how narrowly or broadly those types should be 
characterized and because different characterizations lead to different valuations, we are left 
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with indeterminacy in the valuation of token cases. To close, I identify desiderata, strategies, 
and challenges for solving ambiguity in credit assignments. 
 
2. The Reference Class Problem for Credit Valuation in Science 
The contours of this puzzle about the “coin of recognition” (Merton 1968, 56) become visible 
when one moves beyond thinking about credit in generic abstractions of scientific 
communities toward the heterogeneous communities we find today. I start from this more 
concrete perspective because prestige requires recognition by individuals and forums that are 
themselves valued by credit-seeking scholars (Zuckerman and Merton 1971; Lee 2013): 
credit worthiness in science is a function of the individuals and systems designed to assess, 
allocate, dispute, and enforce it. Although some aspects of Harriet Zuckerman and Robert 
Merton’s narrative about the origins of the normative structure of science have been 
contested by historians (Biagioli 2002; Csiszar 2015), we see the social dynamics they 
proposed clearly at play in contemporary science. For example, Nature Publishing Group 
recently found that — for the 18,354 authors in science, engineering, and medicine surveyed 
— the reputation of a journal is the primary factor driving choices about where to submit 
their work, when reputation is primarily determined by the journal’s impact factor and its 
standing “as the place to publish the best research” (Nature Publishing Group 2015).2 Factors 
 
2 Note that using journal impact factor to measure an individual article’s importance is both 
old-fashioned and problematic: citation distributions within journals are so skewed that it is 
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associated with a journal’s ability to archive and disseminate research — things like a 
journal’s time from acceptance to publication, indexing services, or open access options — 
are much less important.3 
Within academia, each of us simultaneously belongs to multiple communities of 
value. The reference class problem arises when these different communities of value disagree 
about the amount of credit an agent accrues for an act under some state of nature. Although I 
take this problem to be general, for the sake of clarity and simplicity in presentation, I focus 
my examples on communities that can be described as having a nesting structure: for 
example, individual scholars belong to specific subdisciplines, which are nested within 
disciplines, which are nested within a more general population of scholars. A subpopulation 
that is nested within a population can have a credit subculture whose valuations differ from 
those of the population, whose valuations can differ from those of the superpopulation. In 
 
statistically improper to infer the impact of an individual article on the basis of the impact 
factor of the journal in which it is published (San Francisco Declaration on Research 
Assessment 2013, Hicks and Wouters 2015, Wilsdon et al. 2017, Larivière et al. 2016, 
Wilsdon et al. 2015). 
3 Some decision theorists, especially those working outside of philosophy, may reject or 
remain agnostic about attributing mental states such as beliefs to agents (Okasha 2016). 
However, because I understand credit and credit-seeking as sociological phenomena 
involving status beliefs, I am committed to attributing beliefs to agents. 
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these cases, changing how narrowly or broadly one draws the boundaries of an agent’s 
community of valuation can change the amount of credit assigned to a scholarly 
accomplishment, just as changing how one gerrymanders the boundaries of a voting district 
can change its election outcomes. This gives rise to the reference class problem for credit 
valuation in science: to which of the agent’s communities — which reference class — should 
credit valuations be indexed when determining the amount of credit the agent accrues for an 
act under some state of nature?  
There are many examples across academia in which nesting community structures 
can give rise to paradoxes and pathologies in credit assignments. For example, a scholar’s 
individual sense of what counts as quality may deviate from what is endorsed in the 
subdiscipline’s or discipline’s status hierarchy (Centola,Willer, and Macy 2005;Willer, 
Kuwabara, and Macy 2009; Correll et al. 2017).4 A question, technique, or approach that is 
thought to have high impact across fields may have less prominence within each of those 
fields. For example, consider a hypothetical scenario involving an interdisciplinary project 
whose authors and content represent a set of nonoverlapping disciplines: scholars in each of 
 
4 Indeed, savvy scholars can rebel against their field’s disciplinary and sub-disciplinary 
boundaries to form an “unruly alliance” as a new field, as in the example of solid state 
physics, which was formed principally to serve the interests of applied physicists by linking 
their work to related abstract physical research within a new sub-discipline (Martin 2018, 
199). 
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these disciplines prefer purely disciplinary projects over the interdisciplinary project; 
however, when these scholars’ preferences are aggregated, their collective preference is for 
the interdisciplinary project over any single purely disciplinary project (because they prefer 
interdisciplinary projects over purely disciplinary projects that originate from outside their 
own fields). Imagine now that this project gets published in a journal—a journal valued by 
those disciplines—that seeks papers of interest across and beyond disciplines (not just within 
disciplines), akin to the mission statements for Science and Nature.5 Which reference class 
would be most relevant in evaluating the value of the interdisciplinary project (and why)? 
There are other ways of dividing scholarly communities into nesting structures that 
create tensions in credit assignments. The pressures a scholar may feel from the incentive 
structure impacting her department/school may be slightly different from the incentive 
structure impacting her university. A coarse but concrete way to see this is to think about the 
prestige structure reified and reinforced by ranking systems (Sauder and Espeland 2006; 
Espeland and Sauder 2012, 2016), which transform “the ways professional opportunities are 
 
5 Science’s mission to publish papers that “merit recognition by the wider scientific 
community and general public. . . beyond that provided by specialty journals” (AAAS 2020). 
At its inception in 1869, Nature (1869) also aimed to share scientific advances “of general 
interest” with working scientists and the general public; and, as early as 1893, scholars saw 
Nature as a place where they could reach audiences “across increasingly sharp disciplinary 
boundaries” (Baldwin 2015, 72). 
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distributed” within organizations (Espeland and Sauder 2016, 7). Imagine that an untenured 
business school professor with a potentially high impact manuscript needs to burnish her 
prestige in the eyes of both her dean and her provost, since both will evaluate her tenure case. 
If her provost is working to gain stature on the Academic Ranking of World Universities 
(ARWU), the professor should submit her manuscript to Science or Nature, since the ARWU 
ranks universities by their publications in these journals (Academic Ranking of World 
Universities 2018). However, if her dean is trying to gain stature on the Financial Times 
international ranking of MBA programs (Ormans 2016), she should submit to one of the 50 
business, economics, or psychology journals by which the Financial Times ranking system 
evaluates business school prestige — notably, the journal list does not include Science or 
Nature. What should the business school professor do? 
Finally, credit assignments can vary depending on how long a time window a scholar 
keeps in view. A coarse but concrete way to think about this is by looking at how metrics for 
evaluating scholarship change over time. Journal impact factors are becoming less useful 
measures for evaluating an individual’s scholarly contribution: since the advent of the digital 
age, the most elite journals (including Science and Nature) are publishing a decreasing 
percentage of the top-cited papers (Larivière, Lozano, and Gingras 2013); the relationship 
between journal impact factor and paper citations has declined over time (Lozano, Larivière, 
and Gingras 2012); and, the citation distributions between journals “overlap extensively” 
(Larivière et al. 2016). The current wisdom is that if quantitative indicators are to be used to 
evaluate research, it is more useful to use article-level metrics such as citations as well as 
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alternative metrics such as downloads and views (DORA 2013; Hicks and Wouters 2015; 
Wilsdon et al. 2017). On the horizon, there are now calls for creating new metrics that can 
encourage researchers and journals to be transparent and open in their reporting practices 
(Aalbersberg et al. 2017;Wilsdon et al. 2017; NASEM 2018), where the rise of such metrics 
— as well as the growing metaresearch literature that ranks journals by the replicability 
(Schimmack 2015) or sample size and statistical power of their published results (Fraley and 
Vazire 2014) — makes it possible for a journal’s impact factor and epistemic credibility to 
come apart (Fang and Casadevall 2011). Analogously, these new metrics, if assigned to 
individual researchers, may not only reward transparent and open research (Moher et al. 
2019) but also reveal ways in which traditional markers of prestige (e.g., journal impact 
factor, citations, institutional rank) and epistemic credibility can come apart. Other dynamic 
considerations can also give rise to the reference class problem: for example, the audience to 
which junior scholars aim their accomplishments (e.g., related to hiring within a disciplinary 
department or professional school) may differ from the audience they wish to command as 
senior scholars. 
Decision theorists and game theorists capture the risky nature of individual choices by 
allowing for uncertainty about which states of the world will come to be; and, when the 
probabilities attached to different outcomes are understood subjectively, these models permit 
a kind of subjectivity in estimates of expected credit for different acts. However, I hope the 
examples throughout this section animate genuine ambiguity in credit due to the reference 
class problem for credit valuation in science. 
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3. Desiderata, Strategies, and Challenges for Solving the Reference Class Problem 
How might decision theorists and game theorists try to solve the reference class problem for 
credit valuation in science? In order to solve the underlying conceptual problem, one must 
provide theories of community and credit that address two fundamental but vexing questions. 
How should one define and gerrymander the boundaries of the relevant communities invoked 
in the proposed solution? And, how does one determine the amount of credit those 
communities would assign to an act under some state of nature in a way that would be 
normatively and descriptively apt? 
These questions may not be independently answerable. The boundaries of a 
community may need to be defined in terms of patterns of shared lore among its members 
about how credit is accrued — shared beliefs that coordinate credit seeking, credit allotment, 
and enforcement behavior in cases in which status beliefs are internalized as norms and in 
cases in which they are not (Merton 1973; Ridgeway and Correll 2006; Willer et al. 2009). 
Conversely, in recognition that some community members can have more influence than 
others on the content of reigning status beliefs, a community’s credit assignments may need 
to be defined with some reference to the causal patterns of interaction among specific 
individuals and clusters of individuals — including status judges who wield “social control 
through their evaluation of role performance and their allocation of rewards for that 
performance” (Zuckerman and Merton 1971, 66). However, answers to these questions 
should not exclusively inform each other: in particular, we must be careful not to allow the 
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size of a scholarly population or the power of its status judges to fully determine the 
intellectual value of the questions pursued by any particular partition of the scholarly 
universe. 
Strategies that try to address the reference class problem by tackling one question 
without reference to the other simply underscore their mutual dependence. For example, let’s 
imagine an approach that begins by arguing for the “correctness” of one community as 
opposed to others.6 Justifying and defending the centrality of the chosen community is 
difficult to do without reference to substantive causal claims about how credit gets allotted. 
For example, to justify using disciplines as the primary credit-assigning community, it would 
make good sense to observe that scholarly prizes are distributed for excellence in particular 
disciplines (e.g., Nobel, Fields, and academic society prizes) and that judgments about 
disciplinary excellence drive evaluations of quality and merit even in interdisciplinary 
contexts (Lamont 2009). However, it is not difficult to see how others could challenge the 
 
6 Note that indexing credit valuation to a particular community need not prevent scholars 
from outside that community from understanding the relative value of that contribution: for 
example, if one were to adopt the old-fashioned and problematic assumption that an article’s 
impact can be measured by the impact factor of the journal in which it is published, and one 
recognizes that citation rates vary across disciplines, one could use field-normalized 
percentiles to understand a paper’s impact in a metric that is legible across fields (Hicks and 
Wouters 2015). 
 12 
idea that disciplines should be the sole arbiter of credit: after all, Nobel Prize–winning work 
can originate and have higher impact in disciplines outside its awarded field (Szell, Ma, and 
Sinatra 2018), and evaluations of disciplinary excellence can themselves be driven by 
evaluations of subdisciplinary excellence (Lee 2012). However one feels about the claim that 
we should use disciplines as the ultimate arbiters of prestige, it is clear that its justification 
and defense should advert to normative and descriptive claims about how credit assignments 
work. 
Likewise, we can see how the justification and defense for particular credit 
assignments should depend on normative and descriptive claims about community structure. 
For example, let’s imagine a strategy for credit assignment that calculates the credit value of 
a scholarly contribution by summing the credit valuation of multiple communities. This 
approach would need to identify exactly how much to weight each community’s valuation, 
with a rationale for why, since different weightings could lead to different overall credit 
valuations.7 Some scholars take this style of approach when trying to measure the relative 
 
7 Note that summing individual credit assessments into a collective one may not be tenable 
given the challenges of combining individual preferences into collective ones (Arrow 1950). 
Note too that, on the face of it, summing values to calculate an overall score may seem like a 
case of commensuration (Espeland and Stevens 1998). However, the process of 
commensuration requires combining values across qualitatively different domains of value. 
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prestige of journals: in particular, the Eigenfactor score rates journals according to the 
number of incoming citations, where the “relative importance” of each incoming citation is 
contextualized by the frequency with which the citing journal is itself cited (West, 
Bergstrom, and Bergstrom 2010). Justifying and defending this strategy requires invoking 
judgments about how best to demarcate the specific communities whose credit valuations are 
aggregated — in the case of Eigenfactor, populations are demarcated by individual journals. 
At a more basic level, note that even credit-assignments derived from a single community 
require adverting to claims about how to demarcate that particular partition of the scholarly 
universe. 
Finally, any theory of community and credit must countenance apparent 
heterogeneity in community and credit types. A number of recent policy papers call for 
moving toward broader conceptions of research excellence that recognize the diversity of 
research missions among individual scholars, programs, and academic institutions (Hicks and 
Wouters 2015; Wilsdon et al. 2015). Some call for valuing researchers whose work promotes 
rigorous science by using open practices (i.e., sharing code, materials, and data) or by 
replicating and synthesizing existing research (Moher et al. 2019). Others call for recognizing 
the intellectual value of community-engaged scholarship that creates, disseminates, and 
 
As such, this would only count as commensuration if we moved to a pluralistic account 
involving summing heterogeneous kinds of credit. For a more straightforward example of  
commensuration in scientific evaluation, see Lee (2015). 
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implements knowledge in coordination with the public to identify social interventions, 
change social practice, and influence policy (Boyer 1990; DORA 2013; Escrigas et al. 2014; 
Hicks and Wouters 2015). Both of these movements cut across disciplinary and 
subdisciplinary lines, suggesting heterogeneity in credit assignments within fields and 
subfields. 
Note that any approach to addressing heterogeneity must decide how much it can be 
tolerated within gerrymandered communities before those communities must be fractured or 
otherwise redrawn. Too much tolerance and the model becomes descriptively and 
normatively ungrounded. Too little tolerance and the model’s scope is radically decreased: 
for example, a model capturing an individual agent’s personal community and credit 
functions — or the community and credit functions of an “intersectionally” categorized 
group of agents8 — would generalize over a much smaller population than typical models 
that assume that credit is distributed in the same way, using the same credit function, across a 
more broadly drawn community of agents. 
Note too that any approach to addressing apparent heterogeneity in community and 
credit types must be careful about ways that reference class problems can recur. For example, 
if we address heterogeneity in credit types by adopting a multiattribute utility model 
 
8 “Intersectionally” is in scare quotes to mark my metaphorical departure from its standard 
use (Crenshaw 1989). 
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involving qualitatively different types of credit, then we would not know how much credit to 
assign — this time, to multiple credit types — in cases in which different communities assign 
different amounts for each. In this case, increased technical sophistication does not address 
the conceptual problem. 
 
4. Conclusion 
Scientific credit — the “coin of recognition” (Merton 1968, 56) — is assessed, allocated, 
disputed, and enforced by many different communities and institutions within science that 
support and sustain a multiplicity of status hierarchies. This gives rise to what I have called 
the reference class problem for credit valuation in science. 
Those who wish to model the implications of different approaches for solving the 
reference class problem may try to do so by setting up hypothetical communities that assign 
community boundaries and credit assignments in de facto ways to see what kinds of 
behaviors and norms emerge. This work could reveal interesting insights into how different 
ways of gerrymandering intellectual populations — by shifting subdisciplinary and 
disciplinary lines, journal scope, and grant agency program areas/panels — could change 
the kinds of projects and areas that “win.” However, solving the underlying conceptual 
problem requires developing rich, mutually informed theories of community and credit that 
are based on fine-grained information about the structure and status systems of complex, 
heterogeneous scholarly networks. Richer theories of this sort would help us better 
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understand the scope, descriptive power, and normativity of decision and game theoretic 
models of credit seeking in science. 
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